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The purpose of this thesis is to introduce the concept of having a jointly 
integrated networking schema to better enhance battlefield communications and 
the dissemination of information using a smart push/pull concept from the 
highest commander down to the individual soilder. The concept of having a 
robust and dynamic network could provide the United States Armed Forces a 
better way of integrating the individual soldier's performance into higher level 
units. Current systems in the armed forces inventory are not truly interoperable, 
and not everyone has the capability to receive the information that these systems 
carry. A networked battlefield would allow everyone on the. network to receive 
data carried by all systems. 
With smart integration and design using commercially tested standards, 
the network can be built for all battlefield components. Each component would 
bring its equipment into the battlefield and become part of the network. Their 
systems would be able to plug and play with all other systems in the battlefield. 
The liberal use of COTS and GOTS networking equipment will reduce the cost of 
the network and would ensure compatibility among the battlefield components. 
Using OSI layers in the design of the system would ensure compatibility. DOD 
would need to make a concerted effort by having all of the services agree to 
make the battlefield network a top priority. 
v 
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The purpose of this thesis is to introduce the concept of having a jointly 
integrated network to better enhance battlefield communications and the 
dissemination of information using a smart push/pull concept from the highest 
commander down to the individual soldier. The concept of having a robust and 
dynamic network could provide the United States Armed Forces a better way of 
integrating the individual soldier's performance into higher level units. With such 
a system, every member of the battlefield would have access to critical 
information in near real time. Each service could purchase any new data system 
or datalink, and connecting it to the network would mean that anyone on the 
network could access any of the information that the new system carried. The 
· net-centric concept relies heavily on systems engineering concepts and steers 
away from the conventional stovepipe systems commonly found throughout the 
services. Relying on stovepipe systems hampers the services' abilities to work 
together in a joint operation. The implementation of a battlefield network would 
better enhance joint operations and interoperability. The current communications 
systems in use today by the services are not inte.roperable with ·each other. 
They require specific equipment that not all units have in their inventory. 
The battlefield network would help in the achievement of the C4 systems 
objectives as set forth in Joint Pub 6-0. It would also meet most of the doctrinal 
requirements laid out in Joint Pub 6-0. The key to the battlefield network would 
be to take a net-centric approach. The net-centric appro~ch is to have the 
network as the central part in the command, control, and communications 
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structure on the battlefield. Having the network being the center of the structure, 
it will be easier to make the single network hardened than hardening many 
different networks. The net-centric approach would provide connectivity 
throughout the battlefield. As systems enter the battlefield they could be simply 
hooked up to the network. The net-centric approach allows the network to grow 
as the need arises. This. approach also allows the integration of COTS and 
GOTS equipment to meet the needs of the commands on the battlefield. With 
the network as the center of the communications between end systems, the 
interface between the end system and the network can be defined by open 
standards. The net-centric approach allows for the start of internetworking the 
existing stovepipe systems. 
With a networked battlefield the common global vision as set forth in Joint 
Pub 6-0 and C41 For The Warrior would be achieved. The sensor-to-shooter 
concept would also be realized with the inception of a battlefield network. True 
force interoperability could be achieved through mutual cooperation of service 
components in the theater. The interoperability between the services today is 
lacking in many respects and could benefit from a battlefield network. The 
network would allow all of the services to share information in a more dynamic 
way than can be achieved today. 
The battlefield network must meet some standard baselines which 
include: the capability of incorporating radio, cellular, LAN and WAN networks; 
adherence to standards that have been tested in the commercial world of 
networking; an end system must be able to plug into the network at any time or 
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place; the network must be easy to set up and maintain; the network should have 
high availability, reliability, and survivability built into it; and .the network should 
incorporate COTS and GOTS equipment where appropriate. The network 
should also have a flexible backbone for scalability purposes. The network 
should be flexible enough to support any number of forces. 
End systems, sub-nets, and network devices should meet the specific 
requirements of the OSI layers. With these 081 layer ingrained in all networks 
that will comprise the battlefield network, the connection of these networks will 
be simplified, thus making them, as is referred to in the commercial world, plug 
and play. If current systems cannot be adapted to conform to IP and the OSI 
model, then they should be replaced by systems that meet this requirement. 
Current networking COTS and GOTS equipment are available that meet these 
requirements. Other end systems, such as radars, should have network 
compatible LAN, logical, and management interfaces built into them so that they 
can be easily integrated into the network. A good network management system 
has to be used to monitor the network due to the nature of the network and the 
information carried on it. 
Overall, this network could be built today for our forces in the near future. 
The armed forces could have a network that would meet their needs of today as 
well as their needs of tomorrow. Cooperation among the services is needed to 
accomplish this goal. Through cooperation the services will bring the 
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A. PURPOSE OF THESIS 
The purpose of this thesis is to introduce the concept of having a jointly 
integrated networking schema to better enhance battlefield communications and 
the dissemination of information using a smart push/pull concept from the highest 
commander down to the individual soldier. The concept of having a robust and 
dynamic network could provide the United States Armed Forces a better way of 
integrating the individual soldier's performance. With such a system, every 
member of the battlefield would have access to critical information in near real 
time. Each service could purchase any new data system or datalink, and 
connecting it to the network would mean that anyone on the network could access 
any of the information that the new system carried. This would save untold money 
and limit the need for stovepipe systems. The network-centric concept relies 
heavily on systems engineering concepts and steers away from the conventional 
stovepipe systems commonly found throughout the services. Relying on stovepipe 
systems hampers the services' abilities to work together in a joint operation. The 
process of sharing information between the services becomes quite difficult if that 
information is passed over . service-specific devices. This increases the time 
required to share critical information. The information, once received, would not be 
up to date and could cost time and lives depending upon the content of the 
information. In a networked battlefield, information, data, graphics, or national 
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sensor information could be shared in near real time to anyone who would have a 
need for that type of information. 
The network-centric approach would encourage the services to cooperate 
more in acquiring joint systems that would have the capabilities needed by all of 
the forces. For service-specific requirements, the services could port some of the 
data that other battlefield components need to the network. This would ultimately 
save money on the purchasing of hardware and software. The requirements 
placed on the network would be commonality of components (data and protocols). 
The different services would have to agree on these common components. In 
order to save money on implementation one would only have to look at the 
availability of products that are currently out in industry. By using proven 
networking systems, the services could have a network structure for far less 
money than using current service-specific, mission-specific stovepipe systems. By 
looking at the functionality of the Internet, one could only imagine what could be 
achieved in the battlefield of the future. 
B. BACKGROUND 
Since the beginning of armed conflict, history has shown that commanders 
found the need to improve communications down to their respective troops. 
Commanders of our past used instruments (drums, bagpipes, horns), flags, 
lighting devices, messengers, etc., to signal troops and subordinate commanders 
to execute their standing orders. With the inventions of this century, the job of 
communicating to respective subordinates has grown easier on both sides. 
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Therefore, the possibility of a battle happening after peace has been declared, as 
happened· in the War of 1812 with the Battle of New Orleans (the Senate had yet 
to ratify the peace treaty) [Ref. 1], is unlikely to happen in today's environment. 
However, there has been and always will be a need to pass critical 
information up and down the chain of command. In today's battlefield environment 
the passing of this critical information could be better enhanced using existing 
technologies. With the complexity of today's battlefield, the need for this 
information increases exponentially with the destructive power being placed in the 
common soldiers' hands. A platoon soldier armed with a grenade launcher and 
machine gun can level a building in a matter of minutes. A pilot with a standard 
load of iron bombs or a couple of smart weapons could level a platoon, building, or 
other large targets. 
Friendly fire casualties are of great concern to everyo·ne. Without critical 
information, close air support missions could be disastrous. If the pilots are not 
informed of updated positions of friendly forces, the potential is there for friendly 
fire incidents. Current communications are not good enough to provide the 
position updates fast enough. With the use of networks, this position updating 
could occur in near real time. Airborne assets would see the position updates of 
friendly troops in graphical form on their displays. This would increase their 
situational awareness. Artillery units could also benefit from the use of networks 
and near real time information that would be provided on friendly and enemy 
positions. Friendly fire incidents have cost many unnecessary deaths in past wars 
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such as World War I, World War II, Korea, Vietnam, and Desert Storm. Now with 
the introduction of networks to pass data using the pushipull concept these 
incidents could be severely curtailed. 
C. SCOPE 
This thesis is intended to provide a concept of how using layered networks 
could greatly improve the conduct of the art of war by Armed Forces of the United 
States. Also, the armed forces could benefit from this concept due to reduced 
spending on costly systems that are currently in inventory. Information collected 
from current systems could be shared throughout the battlefield with those who 
need the information. The capability of implementing this system could be quickly 
set up and would provide robust communications using current off-the-shelf 
technology and current hardware that is in inventory. The networking concept 
would produce commanders and soldiers with an untold wealth of information that 
would be time critical and could potentially save many lives, plus it could help in 
defeating enemies quickly. 
The networking concept could change the command hierarchy in the 
battlefield. The concept would flatten the command hierarchy structure in the 
battlefield. At present the command hierarchy is more top down; it resembles a 
tree. This would have to be looked at in future studies to determine what kind of 
doctrine would be needed. It should be noticed that the command hierarchy is 
flattened by the phone system when units are in the United States. In theory any 
solider could pick up the phone and dial the number of the commander higher up 
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in his chain of command. That is also true of the commander dialing up the lowest 
soldier under his command and giving him a direct order. This would also be 
possible if a network system is implemented for the battlefield. Although the 
possibility exists, the author believes this would not happen due to the same 
restraints that service members use when located in the United States. 
5 
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II. CURRENT TACTICAL SYSTEMS 
A. OVERVIEW 
This chapter will discuss current ways the military uses to get 
critical information to the warfighter in today's battlefield environment. 
The following systems will be discussed: datalinks, voice communications, 
and the global broadcast system. 
B. LINK-11 
Also known as TADIL A, Link-11 is a netted, two-way, real time, 
encrypted datalink which uses half duplex HF and UHF communications 
circuits for computer-to-computer data interface to pass track information 
management data, command and control information, and status data 
among up to 20 Navy, Marine Corps, and Air·Force participants, Link-11 
uses a star net topology (Figure 1) with discrete transmit but full receive 
Figure 1 Link-11 Star Topology 
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connectivity [Ref. 2]. Link-11 uses a polling protocol and a netted 
architecture. A net operates under a net controller which permits 
participant access and is responsible for circuit discipline. In its normal 
operation, Link-11 is normally operated in Roll Call mode. Participating 
Units (PUs) transmit all reportable data when polled by the Net Control 
Station (NCS). Once a PU transmits it switches to receive mode. The 
NCS then polls the next PU in its list. Figure 2 shows how the polling 
method works with different PUs. In current· terminology, Link-11 is a 
token broadcast. This continues until all of the PUs have transmitted their 
data. The process is then repeated continuously. The time for all PUs in 
the net to be polled and transmit their data at least once is called the net 
cycle time. The goal of the NCS is to keep the net cycle time down. If net 
cycle time is large then the NCS may drop one or more PUs off the net. 
Link-11 uses M-series messages. The messages are made up of two 24-
bit frames. At the fast data rate Link-11 is capable of handling 1800 bits per 
second. With error detection and correction enabled Link-11 -is capable of 
transmitting 2250 bits per second with 6 bits of each frame (30 bit frame, 24 bits 
for data word, 6 bits for encoding) being used for the error detection and correction 
[Ref. 3]. 
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Figure 2 Link-11 Polling From Ref. [4] 
There are many different configurations for Link-11 depending upon the 
platform. A generic configuration is represented in Figure 3 [Ref. 5]. The tactical 
data system computers have two main Link-11 functions. They supply tactical 
digital information to net participants and retrieve and process incoming tactical 
digital information received from net participants. The Key Generator-40 (KG-40) is 
an encryption device. The Data Terminal Set (DTS) converts the data from a 
digital format to an analog audio signal on outgoing data and in the reverse order 








Figure 3 Link-11 Components After Ref. [5] 
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C. LINK-4A 
Link-4A, also known as TADIL-C, is an aircraft control data link. It normally 
interconnects tactical and support aircraft to an aircraft control unit typically to 
support air intercept operations. Link-4A is a half duplex digital data transmission 
system used to transfer aircraft control and target information between a control 
station and a controlled aircraft. It uses a command-and-response protocol along 
with time division multiplexing. This combination derives an apparently 
simultaneous channel from a single frequency. The aircraft controller circuit is in 
basic form a point-to-point circuit. Figure 4 shows a typical Link-4A net. 
The Link-4A messages are either control messages or aircraft reply 
messages. The control messages are known as V-series messages, and the 
aircraft reply messages are known as R-series messages. The controller sends a 
56-bit control message every 32 msec, for a one-way tactical data rate of 1750 
Figure 4 Link-4A Net From Ref. [4] 
bits per second. The effective two-way tactical data rate is approximately 3000 
bits per second. Link-4A does not use parity or error detection and correction [Ref. 
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Figure 5 Link-4A Equipment Configuration Frorn Ref. [6] 
Link-4A is used for other missions besides air control. They are as follows: · 
air traffic control (ATC), automatic carrier landing system (ACLS), carrier aircraft 
inertial navigation system (CAINS), and strike control (STK). ATC is simply precise 
direction of air traffic within a given area. ATC is often used in conjunction with 
ACLS to bring controlled aircraft to a location at which the ACLS may take over 
and guide the aircraft to landing. ACLS is designed to automatically guide aircraft 
down to landing, day or night, either on the deck of a carrier or onto an airfield, 
during the final approach and landing. ACLS operates in either automatic or 
semiautomatic modes. The automatic mode provides direct control to a landing. 
The semiautomatic mode provides the pilot with visual indication of the path to fly 
in order to land. CAINS is the capability through Link-4A to align the inertial 
navigation systems of aircraft with the aircraft carrier. This typically occurs on deck 
before a flight. STK is the directing of aircraft to surface targets in order for the 
aircraft to attempt to destroy those targets. 
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D. LINK-16 
Link-16 (TADIL-J) was developed to support the Command, Control, 
Communications, and Intelligence function in multiservice and Navy battle group 
operations [Ref. 7]. It uses Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) 
terminals along with the computer systems of the units. Figure 6 pictorially 
represents this makeup. Link-16 fills the deficiencies of the existing data links. It 
uses a Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) protocol to increase its capacity over 
other data links. By using TDMA, Link-16 has 30 times the capacity of Link-11 
[Ref. 7]. The highest data rate of a single terminal is 54,000 bits per second. 
However, since TDMA and the division of timeslots are used the overall system 
rate is much higher. The effective data rates of Link-16 are 26,880, or 53,760, or 
107,520 bits per second, depending on which type of data packing structure is 
being used. Link-16 uses J-Series messages. 
Link-16 has the capability to stack different nets. Figure 7 depicts a stacked 
Link-16 net. Multiple nets can be stacked by allowing time slots to be used 
redundantly, with the data transmitted in each net on different frequencies. There 
are 51 frequencies available for transmissions. The frequency is not held constant 
during each time sl9t but is changed rapidly (every 13 microseconds) according to 
a predetermined pseudo-random pattern. This pattern is a fast hopping spread 
spectrum pattern. Each net is assigned a number which designates a particular 
hopping pattern. There are 128 possible numbers, with the number 127 
reserved to indicate a stacked net configuration. During any given time slot, a unit 
12 
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Figure 6 Link-16 System From Ref. [4] 
is either transmitting or receiving on one of 127 possible nets: Although in theory 
there are 127 total possible nets, analysis has shown that approximately 20 
different nets can be co-located without mutual interference [Ref. 4]. 
Figure 7 Link-16 Stacked Net From Ref. [4] 
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For security of communications, each JTIDS terminal is equipped with a 
Secure Data Unit. The Secure Data Unit provides for message and transmission 
security. Each message is encoded at transmission with a unique transmission 
security crypto variable. This variable establishes a hopping pattern and 
pseudorandum noise encoding. Each transmission is also data encrypted to 
provide message security prior to transmission. A further enhancement to security 
is the combination of the pseudo-random hopping patterns, TDMA, and the way 
that the messages can be formatted. This combination provides randomness and 
complexity further preventing an enemy from gaining information that is passed 
over a Link-16 net [Ref. 7]. 
Link-16 operates in the 960-1215 MHz range. This normally produces line-
of-site connectivity; however by using relaying units, connectivity can be provided 
to units beyond line-of-sight. The TDMA propagation time limit determines the 
maximum point-to-point range. JTIDS point-to-point connectivity by line-of-sight is 
less than 300 nm. This range can be extended to approximately 500 nm using 
relays. These relays are akin to bridges and repeaters in a network. 
Link-16 tracks incorporate all Link-11 tracks, plus it is capable of reporting 
land tracks. It also has the capability of unit identification which includes platform, 
activity, specific type, and nationality. It also incorporates an identity of Neutral. 
Friendly aircraft can report equipment status, exact ordnance inventory, radar and 
missile channels, fuel available for transfer, gun capability, and ETA and ETD to or 
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from station. The capability of reporting areas and lines has been enhanced over 
the current capabilities of the Link-11 system. 
Link-16, Link-11 , and Link-4A all rely on different message formats. For this 
reason they are not very flexible. This problem, among others, would have to be 
fixed in order for them to be integrated into a network environment. Link-16 also 
relies on a JTIDS terminal for its interface. For use in a network environment this 
would have to be corrected also. 
E. GLOBAL BROADCAST SYSTEM (GBS) 
GBS is a new application based on the popular commercial Direct 
Broadcast Service (DBS). GBS has a high data rate up to 23 Mbps and a small 
receive antenna. The concept of GBS is to provide secure simultaneous 
broadcast of data to a theater of operations, world-wide coverage from 70°N to 70° 
S, and use commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) equipment. It should have the 
capability to transmit data at all classification levels from unclassified to SCI. GBS 
will use the asynchronous transfer mode (ATM) for its switching technology. The 
GBS concept of operations provided the following [Ref. 8): 
• provide for two modes of operation: wide area coverage and steerable 
"spot beams." 
• provide three classes of tailored service: continuous, periodic, and on-
demand. 
• maintain interoperability with IP-based addressing schemes. 
• augment current MILSATCOM systems. 
• use Global Command and Control System (GCCS) as the primary 
interface for service requests. 
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• transmit data from CONUS uplink sites while allowing in-theater (CINe-
responsive) injection of data. 
Currently there are no military MILSATCOM communication systems 
optimized for GBS. Currently there are plans to place transponders aboard the 
last four of the US Navy's Ultra High Frequency Follow-On (UFO) satellites. This 
will allow each UFO satellite to have two steerable spot-beams (500 nautical mile 
diameter coverage each) operating at 24 Mbps, one wide area (200 nm) GBS 
broadcast operating at 1 .544 Mbps, and an uplink accessibility from at least one 
(of four) NCTAMS site at all times. Initial GBS operational capability is slated for 
the first quarter of 1998. However, there are fourteen US warships with DBS 
commercial systems. There are also theater level GBS systems being used in the 
US for testing and supporting US and NATO Forces in Bosnia. As the capabilities 
evolve, operations and capabilities of GBS will be expanded. 
F. VOICE COMMUNICATIONS 
Voice communication has been the mainstay of military communications. A 
majority of information transferred to the shooter today is carried out over voice 
nets. Voice communications does have its place on the battlefield but does at 
times cause confusion and does not always provide the picture needed to 
enhance situational awareness. Commanders typically use voice communications 
to tell their troops what to do and how to carry out their mission. A majority of air 
control is carried out by two-way voice communication. Datalinks have eased the 
need to report everything by voice, but some datal inks use voice for net control. 
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Various types of radios are used to carry out this communication. Cellular 
phones have also made their way into military use. This technology has many 
promises for future use. It can be used for voice transmissions, and when a 
modem is attached it works great for transmitting data over the circuit. The Army 
is buying the SINCGARS radio which is a great tactical voice radio but has a 
limited data capability. Advertised digital data rates from General Dynamics 
technical specifications sheet are 600, 1200, 2400, 4800, and 16,000 bits per 
second using frequency shift keying [Ref. 9]. The SINCGARS radio operates in 
the 30 to 87.975 Mhz range [Ref. 9]. It also has a frequency hopping capability 
which makes it harder to jam and have its transmissions intercepted. Overall, 
voice communications is still needed in some areas, but in other areas it could be 
replaced with data communications that could offer the shooter more information 
in less time. 
G. SUMMARY 
This chapter has focused on some of the current systems that are used in 
the military for passing information. These systems are not interoperable with 
each other due to their different messaging formats. The information that all of 
these systems pass should be available to everyone who nee.ds that data without 
having to have specific equipment. Link-16 is the newest data link in the system 
but not everyone will have access to the information passed over it due to the cost 
of the hardware required. 
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The data links in their current form are not compatible with a network 
environment. The compatibility issues will be discussed later in this thesis. In the 
next chapter the basic objectives and doctrine for a C4 system will be discussed 
along with a network concept that can be applied to the battlefield. Some of the 
systems discussed in this chapter could be integrated into a network with ease 
while others would need major modifications. 
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Ill. OBJECTIVES AND DOCTRINE' 
A. C4 SYSTEMS OBJECTIVES 
Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) 
Systems Support to Joint Operations (Joint Pub 6-0), sets forth fundamental 
objectives that a C4 system has to meet. These objectives are [Ref. 1 0]: 
• Produce Unity of Effort. C4 Systems should help a military force and 
its supporting elements to combine the thoughts and impressions of 
multiple commanders and key warfighters. This allows the views of 
many experts to be brought to any task. 
• Exploit Total Force Capabilities. C4 systems must be planned as 
extensions of human senses and processes to help people form 
perceptions, react, and make decisions. This allows people to be 
effective during high-tempo operations. C4 systems must be 
immediately responsive, simple, and easily understandable. 
• Properly Position Critical Information. C4 systems must be able to 
respond quickly to requests for information where it is needed. 
• Information Fusion. The ultimate goal of C4 systems is to produce a 
picture of the battlespace that is accurate and meets the needs of 
warfighters. This goal is achieved by fusing information and putting it in 
a form that people can act on. With concise, accurate, timely, and 
relevant information, unity of effort is improved and uncertainty is 
reduced, enabling the force as a whole to exploit opportunities and fight 
smarter. 
Unity of effort, as defined by Joint Pub 1 [Ref. 11 ], starts at the national 
level with the national security strategy which employs the politicaVdiplomatic, 
economic, informational, and military powers of the nation to secure national policy 
aims and objectives. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) along with 
the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in turn make the national 
military strategy to provide focus for the US military. When a crisis breaks out the 
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combatant commander in charge of that region is normally supported by other 
combatant commanders, and federal agencies, thus focusing the unity of effort to 
that crisis. Unity of effort transcends time and technology, but in today's 
environment unity of effort is supported in this endeavor by technology. The 
battlefield network can help in this unity of effort. Information from other 
combatant commanders, JCS, and federal agencies could pass over connections 
to the network where it can then be distributed throughout the battlefield. The sub-
nets bringing that information in could also be used for communications with 
supporting combatant commanders, JCS, and federal agencies to help the local 
combatant commander solve difficult problems. 
The network also allows exploitation of total force capabilities by providing 
commanders a total battlefield picture. The foiWard troops provide the 
commanders with the information of the battlespace that surrounds them, much 
like the fingers on a hand. The national systems sensors provide more 
information about the battlefield. With all of this information a battlefield picture is 
formed and the commanders can make decisions, react to the changing 
battlefield, and disseminate their orders quickly to subordinate commanders. 
Equally as important, lower echelon commanders could pass information up the 
chain of command concerning actions that they have taken on their own initiative. 
Critical information would be within easy reach of everyone who needed that 
information in a networked environment. Distributed databases would allow 
warfighters to pull information that they needed in order to make more informed 
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decisions. The network could not itself fuse the information but could pass the 
fused information quickly throughout the network to battlefield commanders. 
B. BASIC DOCTRINE FOR C4 SYSTEMS 
For a C4 system Joint Pub 6-0 puts forth some basic doctrine that any 
system has to meet. This doctrine is inherent in a network. They are as follows 
[Ref. 1 0]: 
• C4 Systems must provide the rapid, reliable, and secure flow and 
processing of data to ensure continuous information exchange 
throughout the force. An unbroken chain of communications must 
extend from the National Command Authorities (NCA), through the 
Chairman of the Joint Chief's of Staff (CJCS), to the combatant 
commanders, commanders of Service· components,. and all subordinate 
commanders. 
• Operations, logistics, and intelligence functions all depend on 
responsive C4, the central system that ties together all aspects of 
joint operations and allows commanders and their staffs to 
command and control their forces. 
• C4 systems provided to combatant commanders operate under 
their authority and will be an integral part of their C2 infrastructure. 
• Joint Force Commanders (JFC} must develop operational 
procedures that provide interoperable, compatible, C4 networks. 
• The complexity of joint operations and the finite amount of C4 
resources may require the JFC to adjudicate or assign subordinate 
command responsibilities for providing C4 systems support. 
The preceding doctrine are goals for a C4 system. However, these goals 
are not currently met. The second basic doctrine listed concerns operations, 
logistics, and intelligence functions. Currently separate systems are used to 
support these functions. With a battlefield network, these functions would be 
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carried out on the same infrastructure. This would eliminate the need to have 
separate systems. 
One problem with this basic doctrine lies in the portion that C4 systems 
provided to combat commanders operate under their authority. This portion of the 
doctrine is a prescription for stove-piping systems. Networks do not inherently 
subscribe to this philosophy. Networks, by nature, are expansive because of the 
widely varying interoperability needs of the network. The network would also have 
resources outside of the combatant commander's control. Some of these 
resources outside the commander's control would include national sensors, 
databases maintained by national agencies, and other information sources or 
sensor platforms. A network by its nature is more adept at fitting into a flattened 
command structure than a hierarchical structure. In a network environment, 
personnel do not have to rely on commanders to supply information to them. They 
can go to the source on the network and pull the information to· them. The network 
provides connectivity to everyone. This is one reason that a network supports a 
more flattened command structure. However, a network can be structured to 
support a hierarchical command structure, but this is more of a doctrinal issue than 
it is a network issue. Thus this portion of doctrine should be examined for 
networks, especially for a battlefield network. 
A battlefield network will provide a reliable means for passing information 
throughout the battlefield forces. Through connectivity with sub-networks that 
extend from the United States to the battlefield, the NCA and CJCS can 
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communicate to the commanders on the battlefield. This would be inherently built 
into the network through its design. The network would be able to accommodate 
network traffic from the support personnel from all services. The reordering of 
supplies and requests for intelligence data could easily pass through the network 
and reach its destination quickly. This is due to the connectivity of the network. 
The interoperability and compatibility will be built into the network. The equipment 
brought into the battlefield by components will be a part of the C2 infrastructure. 
Each battlefield unit will be able to bring their equipment and hook into the 
network. This will solve many issues that are now faced in the battlefield 
environment. These include compatibility, interoperability, anc,i the ability to share 
information. 
C. NET-CENTRIC CONCEPT 
As the armed forces approach the next century, the weapon systems that 
are being put in use. are more complex and deadly. The sensors used to target 
these weapons are providing more information than those of the past. The way 
that data is provided throughout the battlefield has also changed, but it has not 
kept up with technology and commercial world solutions to pass the data. 
The key to t~e battlefield network would be to take a n'et-centric approach. 
The net-centric approach is to have the network as the central part in the 
command, control, and communications structure on the battlefield. Having the 
network being the center of the structure, it will be easier to make that single 
network hardened than hardening many different networks. By having the network 
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in the center of the structure it will be more important to harden this network. The 
network's design should be such that provisions for availability, reliability, and 
connectivity be built in throughout the battlefield. Initially this will be expensive to 
do but will pay off in the end. By paying attention to the details of the design the 
network will be more survivable and meet the needs of the armed forces. This 
would also provide more robust data sharing. 
Current communication systems would be connected to the network. 
Figure 8 is a pictorial view of the net-centric concept. The network is in the center 
of the battlefield command, control, and communications system. 
• The net-centric approach provides connectivity throughout the 
battlefield. 
• Additional systems that are brought into the battlefield could be simply 
hooked up to the network. 
• As new systems are built they would have to include connectivity and 
data sharing capability with other systems that connect to the network. 
• A net-centric approach allows the network to grow as the needs arise. 
This approach also allows the integration of COTS and government of the 
shelf (GOTS) equipment to meet the needs of the commands on the battlefield. 
The integration is a benefit of the net-centric concept. With the network as the 
center of the communications between end systems, the interface between the 
end system and the network can be defined by open standards. Each end system 
that is connected to the network would have to be looked at individually to see 
what can be bought commercially to interface with the network and what would 
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have to be built specifically for that system to interface with the network and meet 







Figure 8 Network Subsection After Ref. [13] 
With the increase in the development of computer and networking 
technologies in the past few years, the time has come for the armed forces to start 
internetworking the existing stove-pipe systems. The net-centric approach is one 
way to achieve this integration. 
Our enemies in the future will have access to the same computer and 
networking technology that is available to our armed forces. Some of these 
enemies will have their information systems networked providing them with shared 
information. These same enemies may also share the same infrastructure for 
data transmission as our armed forces. Our armed forces' and our enemy's data 
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could pass over the same satellite and telephone lines. This would present a great 
problem in that you could not take down the enemy's datalinks as it would affect 
our armed forces' data that passes over the same links. As more dual use 
technology (such as cellular satellite services, internet connectivity, and telephone 
lines) becomes available world-wide, more countries' armed forces will use this 
technology. Our armed forces will use this technology for communications and 
our allies will use this technology in theater. 
D. BENEFITS OF A BATTLEFIELD NETWORK 
With a networked battlefield the common global vision as put forth in Joint 
Pub 6-0 and C41 For The Warrior would be achieved. Figure 9 is from Joint Pub 6-
0 [Ref. 1 0]. It is the evolution of C41 for the Warrior in a pictorial view. This shows 
the migration from WWMCCS to GCCS and the extension of that to the battlefield. 
Another benefit of a battlefield network is that the sensor-to-shooter concept would 
also be realized. Sensor in~9rmation is on the network. In some cases this data 
would have to be fused for the upper echelons of command. This would help give 
the higher commanders the battlefield picture without showing every platoon 
member's position, but a symbol of the platoon's position would be shown instead. 
As the relevant command descends the organizational hierarchy, the positions of 
each platoon member would become more important. Before shooters would be 
allowed to shoot at a target, the Command and Control (C2) node, which is also 
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Figure 9 The Evolution of C41 for the Warrior After Ref. [11] 
authorization is given to take out a target. The prioritization by the C2 node is 
more of a doctrinal issue than it is a network issue. The C2 node can add 
discipline, but positive control or control by negation is a matter of doctrine and the 
rules of engagement (ROE). The C2 node could reduce the instances of using 
weapons on secondary targets before hitting the primary targets. For some of the 
ground shooters, sensors reporting enemy ground forces would give much better 
situational awareness to those shooters. 
By having a networked battlefield, true force interoperability could be 
achieved through mutual cooperation of service components in the theater. The 
network would allow all of the services to share information in a more dynamic way 
than before. Intelligence cells from all services could share information quickly 
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from different parts of the battlefield to form a battlespace picture of the enemy 
and friendly positions. The Air Tasking Order could be disseminated to everyone 
no matter what system they are using by sending it over the network. Force 
integration could be used by the Joint Force Commander (JFC) to achieve an 
objective. The JFC could disseminate his orders to subordinate commanders 
swiftly. In turn, those subordinate commanders would then be able to further make 
decisions and pass their orders down the chain of command until those orders are 
executed. Overall, the network battlefield would allow quicker sensing of the 
battlefield, more informed decision making, and faster actions based on those 
decisions. 
The discussion in this chapter has focused on the objectives and basic 
doctrine of a C4 system, the net-centric approach and the benefits of a networked 
battlefield. The evolution of networking the battlefield will happen eventually as the 
benefits of networking become apparent to all members qf the military. An 
approach to building the battlefield network will be offered in the next chapter. 
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IV. THE NETWORK VISION 
A. THE BIG PICTURE 
The following lists of bulleted items lay the baseline for a battlefield network. 
• A battlefield network must be able to incorporate radio, cellular, LAN 
and WAN networks. 
• Using commercial standards in the network would be a big benefit to 
DOD, because these standards could be proved and improved upon in 
the commercial market first before being incorporated into the battlefield 
network. 
• These standards decided upon would have to be in use in the 
commercial world. This would make sure that they are tested before 
they are used in the battlefield network, thus saving DOD the cost of 
development and testing. 
• A side benefit of using commercial products is that they tend to be more 
user friendly than strictly military-developed products. 
• Any end system must be able to plug into the network at any time or 
place. 
• The network should be capable of carrying any kind of data from email 
to imagery and tactical track data that is currently carried in current 
tactical data links. 
• The network should be easy to set up and maintain. 
• This network should have high availability, reliability, and survivability 
built into it. 
• The network should incorporate COTS and GOTS equipment where 
appropriate. By using commercial products, where appropriate, the 
Department of Defense (DOD) could target research and development 
funds on the parts of the network that would have to be developed 
rather than reinventing the already available parts. 
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The terms "end system" and "sub-net" will be used throughout this section. 
An end system is any system that produces or consumes data. A sub-net is 
connected to an end system and passes data through it. Sub-nets can be 
internetworked. A sub-net can be considered as a transmission pipe. Some 
examples of end systems are aircraft, command centers, and platoons. Examples 
of sub-nets are current tactical data links (Link-16, Link-11, Link-4A), Mobile 
Subscriber Equipment (MSE) nets, GBS, and current radio networks. 
Figure 1 0 shows a portion of the envisioned network. As more units enter 
the battlefield they could simply plug into the network. The network could start out 
as a radio WAN, and as non-mobile units enter the battlefield, a terrestrial WAN 
could be set up to accommodate those units and meet the high traffic needs. 
In Figure 10 there is a mix of different components that make up the 
battlefield network. This figure is the second layer down from Figure 8. What is 
not represented here is the mobile forces that move from one point in the network 
to another. An example of this would be an aircraft that is initially hooked into the 
ship's LAN and after takeoff plugs into another section of the network. Another 
issue that this figure cannot represent is the security that is inherently involved in a 
military network. Also network management compatibility is not represented. 
On the other hand Figure 1 0 does show a good user perspective of the 
battlefield network. There are numerous ways to connect to the network. The 
LAN on the left side could be a logistics or intelligence cell that has connectivity 
through the terrestrial WAN to the rest of the network thus allowing passage 
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Figure 10 The Battlefield Network After Ref. [13] 
of data throughout the battlefield. The ship also has connections to the network 
via a router hooked into the radio WAN. This would allow direct connectivity to 
the units who need the firepower that the ship can provide. The Joint Task Force 
command center has connectivity through the network so that dissemination of 
orders and gathering of information can easily happen. The Joint Task Force 
command center could also pass information that is resident on GCCS to the rest 
of the battlefield if the need arises. 
The overall structure of the network is not known before forces arrive in the 
theater. As forces arrive into the theater the network would grow. Individual units 
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would have to bring in their equipment to hook up to the network. The units would 
then plug into the existing network. The key to having a successful network would 
be to make sure that the right pieces are brought into the theater and that all of the 
systems that are brought in are interoperable. Making sure that the right 
equipment is brought to the theater would be a logistics but not an interoperability 
problem. Staging components in theater would help in assuring the right set of 
parts for connectivity. The MSE would be brought in by the Army, and the Marine 
Corps would bring in their Tactical Data Network (TON) which should be fielded by · 
the next century. Other units could bring in mobile cellular systems that could be 
used for wireless LANs. Ships could connect to the network through the radio 
portion of the network. Host nation links could be used for connectivity to the 
United States. Also, GBS systems could be used for connectivity with the US. 
B. DESIGN ISSUES 
The design of this network has to be such that components brought in by 
units can be easily connected to other units without degradation of the network. 
The network has to be scalable to meet the needs of everyone on the battlefield. 
The network can start out as radio-based, but as more non-mobile command, 
intelligence, and logistic centers enter the battlefield environment a terrestrial WAN 
should be added to handle traffic and relieve some of the congestion on the radio 
WAN. 
A flexible backbone is needed to make the network scalable. This can be 
achieved by designing each sub-net with the capability of plugging into each other. 
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This can be achieved by using routers that can pass the data from one sub-net to 
the other. A terrestrial backbone could be easily integrated into the network as the 
need arises. This integration is important for making this network flexible. 
An end system should have compatibility with the Open Systems 
Interconnection Reference Model (OSI) top four layers. The top four layers in this 
model are application, presentation, session, and transport layers [Ref. 12]. In 
order for end systems to be good network citizens they must be able to handle the 
top four layers. The application layer is where conversion of terminal input or 
output from an application program is put into a message block. The presentation 
layer is where format definition, encryption, and compression of the data takes 
place. The message block beginning and ending marks occur in the session layer. 
The session layer also determines if half or full duplex transmission will be used. 
The transport layer divides very long message blocks into shorter blocks for 
transmission, adds a sequence number to each block, adds a checksum for error 
detection, checks for duplicate blocks, adds security to message blocks, and 
services for missed chunks. 
Similar applications in all systems have to be compatible. The application 
layer would have to accept common data formats such as email, imagery, and 
data from tactical data links. There would be a need to conform to interoperable 
applications that would be used over the network. For instance, e-mail user 
agents must handle body parts the same way, or else the files sent over the 
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network would be useless to the receiver. This does not say that everyone has to 
use the same programs but that the programs used have to meet the standards. 
The network layer chunks the message down into predetermined-size 
packets, attaches the addresses and sequence numbers to the packets, identifies 
the routes for the packets through the network and then passes the packets to the 
data link layer. Of course, the use of IP (Internet Protocol) is key to success of the 
network. The use of IP in the network layer makes for a smoother transition in the 
data link and physical layers which are beneath the network layer. IP should be 
used in the routers and other internetworking hardware. IP would have to be 
established in the current sub-nets before they could be . integrated into the 
network. 
The sub-nets not only have to interface with the network layer but they also 
have to conform with the OSI's data link and physical layers. The data link layer 
inserts the packet into a frame that becomes the envelope for carrying the packet 
during transmission. It then adds a frame sequence number and confirms 
checksums for error detection. A copy of the frame is kept for retransmission in 
case of a transmission error. It then passes the frame to the physical layer. The 
physical layer is where the frame is sent out to its destination iri the form of a serial 
stream of bits. The current sub-nets, such as Link-16, Link-11 , and Link-4A 
perform well in the data link and physical layers but they do not interface well with 
the network layer. 
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With these OSI layers ingrained in networks that will comprise the 
battlefield network, the connection of these networks will be simplified thus making 
them, as is referred to in the commercial world, plug and play. If current systems 
cannot be adapted to conform to IP and the OSI model then they should be 
replaced by systems that meet this requirement. Current networking COTS and 
GOTS equipment meet these requirements. 
Other end systems such as radars should have network compatible LAN, 
logical, and management interfaces built into them. This would ensure that 
information produced by these end systems could pass over the network to other 
end units that need this data. This would allow end units to coordinate attacks on 
enemy forces. An example of this would be that a Patriot battery could see the 
radar returns from an Aegis cruiser and vice-versa. This would help in getting 
better shots at incoming missiles for either platform. 
High availability requirements need to be built into ~his network. High 
availability has three main principles. They are elimination of single points of 
failure, provision of reliable crossovers, and prompt detection of failures [Ref. 13]. 
Figure 11 represents two local area networks connected to a wide area network 
via routers. If eith~r router suffered a failure it would be cut off from the network 
until repairs are accomplished. The information that this LAN produces or 
consumes could be life-critical. To ensure that the data gets through the WAN or 
from the WAN to the LAN, the single point of failure should be eliminated. 
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Figure 11 Single Points of Failure After Ref. [13] 
Figure 12 shows one way to eliminate this point of failure. Notice that not 
only are the routers interconnected but also the LANs are interconnected. The 
dual interconnections are the ideal case but may not be practical. For the sub-nets 
to be interconnected they must homogeneous. These interconnections provide the 
reliable cross connections. This would help eliminate single points of failure. With 
this setup in Figure 12, data could bypass trouble spots and reach its destination. 
Now this approach needs to be incorporated into the building of the network. 
During every phase of development, all aspects of the layout should be looked at 
for single points of failure. 
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Figure 12 Eliminating Single Points of Failure After Ref. [13] 
The detection of failures falls under network management and the network 
management system (NMS). A NMS will have to be user friendly and easy to 
learn. It should be graphically oriented, but also have the capability for command 
line interface to meet all networks managers' requirements. · The NMS should 
have good functional capability in the OSI management framework's five functional 
areas. These areas are fault management, performance management, 
configuration management, accounting management, and security management. 
A NMS with liberal use of hypermedia would help the network managers 
quickly isolate trouble spots in the network. Hypermedia could be used by the 
network managers to view the topology of the network at any level. With a 
graphical user interface, a network manager could select a portion of the network. 
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Once the portion was selected the next layer of the topology would appear. This 
would be very useful in helping to isolate trouble spots on the network. If a trouble 
spot was located, the color of the device on the topology would change based on 
the severity of the degradation in the device. A network manager could then click 
on the device and the inventory management database would provide information 
on the type of device it is and what other devices it is connected to. This would 
expedite getting repairs accomplished and minimize down time in that area. As 
the network grows, the NMS should be adaptable to easily integrate new LANs 
and other components. 
For the non-radio-based LANs, a Fiber Data Distributed Interface (FDDI) 
ring with optical fiber connectivity is recommend by the author. FDDI uses two 
counter-rotating rings. Each node connected to the rings can detect failures. With 
the dual-attachment station (DAS) which physically connects to both rings, a failure 
of a node will not bring down a network. The DAS uses the undamaged ring to 
reroute the data thus isolating the failed node and keeping the network functioning 
[Ref. 12]. Figure 13 is a pictorial representation of isolation of a failed node. With 
connections on a fiber FDDI ring, optical bypass switches should be installed to 
allow data to pass ~round downed nodes. Downed nodes could be either failed, 
turned off, or in the process of being repaired. The FDDI ring could be easily 
attached to other network components. Fiber optic cable would also provide a 





Figure 13 FDDI Isolating a Failed Node From Ref. [13] 
Data 
Wrap 
If the design factors are taken into account with each new acquisition and if 
upgrades are made to existing networks, the battlefield network can be achieved 
by DOD and provide lasting connectivity for the battlefield. The time has come for 
more networking solutions to support the way that the armed forces conduct 
business in the battlefields or peacekeeping missions of tomorrow. 
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V. CLOSE AIR SUPPORT SCENARIO 
A. BACKGROUND 
This scenario will involve three aircraft, two Navy F/A-18s and a Marine 
Corps AV-88. The AV-88 has primary tasking for close air support (CAS). The 
AV-88's base of operations is a land base while the F/A-18s are carrier-based. 
The F/ A-18s have primary tasking of a bombing mission but have alternate 
tasking of CAS if needed. The network battlefield as described earlier is in place. 
All aircraft are equipped with the capabilities to access sub-nets and have 
UHFNHF, HF and cellular radios. This scenario will focus on information passing 
and the switching of networks. 
B. PREFLIGHT 
During preflight the F/ A-18s are connected by cable to the aircraft carrier's 
LAN. The AV-88 during preflight operations connects to the .airbase's LAN. The 
mission computer loads the latest update on target information. Friendly position 
information is also uploaded. The carrier's and airfield's databases are updated by 
the ordnance personnel who put the weapons on the aircraft. If there is any 
problem with any of the aircraft's systems the parameters could be downloaded to 
the maintenance personnel of the aircraft's squadron. 
C. FLIGHT MISSION 
The AV-88 launches and proceeds on station. The pilot on his way to the 
target area switches to the LAN of the company that he is going to support. The 
reason for the switching to a different LAN is not an issue of receiving information 
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but is a matter of physical location. The LAN of the company happens to be in the 
physical area of the AV-88. By connecting to the company's LAN, information 
could be passed quicker between the pilot and the company. A message is sent 
to the forward air controller (FAC) in that area that contains the aircraft's weapon 
load, status, and position information. This could be automatically sent or manually 
sent by the pilot depending upon how the aircraft's software is set up to handle 
messaging. The message travels through the company's LAN through the 
network to the FAG's LAN. Friendly position information is updated as well as 
target information. This information is displayed graphically on the pilot's display 
panel. The pilot's display is automatically updated at a predetermined interval. 
The updates occur because the company's LAN is sending constant updates to 
the pilot. Position information on this LAN is sent out automatically by all units to 
all units connected to the LAN. The updates are handled by the aircraft's 
computer. If voice communication is needed the pilot can use .any of the radios for 
that purpose. After completing the mission the aircraft returns to the airfield. On 
the way back to the airfield, the pilot can send mission information through the 
network to the FAC or anyone else who needs the information. If the pilot has 
enough fuel and ammunition the FAC could decide to use him in another sector for 
CAS. He can also send information concerning the aircraft back to his unit. This 
will help in turnaround time and maintenance repairs. 
The F/A-18s in route to their bombing mission get continuous updates of 
the friendly and known enemy forces near their target through the FAG's LAN. The 
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continuous updates are simply a matter of the FAC forwarding this information to 
all aircraft in their area of control. They could have received this information from 
anywhere in the battlefield. In fact, during preflight they received this information 
by accessing the FAG's database through the carrier's LAN which is connected to 
the battlefield network via routers. Their target is an enemy power plant. They 
notice (by an icon on their tactical display) that a reconnaissance platoon is near 
their target. The flight lead selects the icon and the platoon's information is 
displayed. The flight lead notes the platoon leader's address and sends a 
message through the network asking if the platoon has a laser designator. This 
message could be sent manually or through the selection of the address on the 
display. The graphical user interface on the displays are user friendly. This would 
be like selecting an icon on a computer. The platoon leader sends a message 
back stating that they have one. The platoon leader is equipped with a handheld 
device that has the capability of displaying a tactical map with an overlay of the 
tactical picture that is constantly updating. The tactical map is on a CD/ROM 
which is housed in the device. The device is connected to the network via a 
wireless LAN. The device has software capable of sending and receiving 
messages and other types of data. The device also has the capability of 
connecting to a digital camera for sending imagery taken on ·the battlefield. The 
flight lead sends another message asking if they would use it to guide their bombs 
into the target because this would increase the standoff distance of the aircraft. 
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After the aircraft drop their bombs, they send the footage shot by the 
camera on the aircraft back to the area's command and control (C2) node for 
battle damage assessment. The capability of sending the imagery and other 
sensor information from the aircraft is available because the aircraft's database 
stores this information. Through the aircraft's computer the pilot can select this 
information and send it to anyone connected to the network. The reason that the 
information is sent to the C2 node is doctrinal in nature and not a limitation of the 
battlefield network. The platoon also sends pictures of the bombed power plant 
back to the C2 node. The C2 node will make a decision if another attack is 
necessary. This decision is based on the BOA and the reports from the pilots and 
the platoon leader. If another attack is warranted the C2 node will determine what 
assets are at its disposal and check the weapon load reported by the units and 
redirect them as needed. The C2 node will make this determination based upon 
the Air Tasking Order (ATO) and by checking with the FAC for what assets they 
could redirect to re-attack the power plant. They would be able to determine what 
weapons are on the aircraft because all aircraft report their weapon load to the 
FAC in their area. Another way that the C2 node could determine what assets to 
use would be to look at the tactical picture of the area and check the ATO to see 
which aircraft would have the weapons needed to bomb the power plant. The C2 
node does not need the F/A-18 for their secondary CAS mission. They are sent 
back to the carrier. 
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D. POST MISSION 
On the way back to their respective landing sites all aircraft switch from the 
sub-nets that they were on to their landing sites' LANs. There they download 
pertinent mission data and upload landing information. They can also send 
maintenance personnel messages that contain information on aircraft status. This 
would help maintenance personnel in quickly turning around the aircraft for future 
missions. The ordnance personnel would know what ordnance was expended. 
For the aircraft carrier this information would help in knowing where to park the 
aircraft upon landing. This would help the carrier to organize for the next cycle of 
flight operations. 
E. SUMMARY 
Currently, the scenario described in this chapter is handled mostly by voice 
communications. This scenario had all information passed over the battlefield 
network. This author does not suggest that voice communication should not be 
used, but much information could and should be passed over the network. The 
author does suggest that by having a battlefield network, operations could be 
better carried out and that interoperability is improved between different services. 
Positioning information should be passed over a network so that when conducting 
CAS missions, the pilots' situational awareness is enhanced. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
Communication in the armed forces in the continental United States is 
turning towards networking. More personnel are communicating with email via the 
internet. More DOD agencies are putting up web pages. on the world-wide 
internet. As a natural extension to this connectivity in the United States that there 
will be a natural progression to have a battlefield network. With joint cooperation 
among the services and the other DOD agencies, the battlefield network could and 
should come into existence. The approach provided in this thesis is but one of 
several alternatives. If the recommendations made in this thesis are followed, the 
battlefield network will provide robust communications that could expand as the 
need arises. 
Each service has its own systems for communicatio·n. Some of these 
systems such as Link-11 and Link-16 are shared by other services. Not everyone 
in the service have access to the information that is carried over these systems. 
lnteroperability should be a standard for all of the services. The only way to 
achieve interoperability is for the services to agree that any future systems would 
have the capability to communicate with other services' systems. The next step 
would be to change the way that we design and buy systems. It is time for the 
armed forces, in this time of dwindling budgets, to look to the commercial world for 
products that can be purchased to supplement military-specific communication 
systems. What cannot be purchased then can be developed by the armed forces 
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to fit the needs. However, the systems must be able to be integrated. The 
functionality described earlier needs to be incorporated. 
The battlefield network will eventually be realized. The quality of this 
network will depend on the design and how the services put it together. Stovepipe 
systems are costly and cannot be supported properly. The warfighter of the future 
needs communication abilities that transcend service boundaries. lnteroperability 
among the services will be required at the lowest level of the chain of command as 
more operations conducted by DOD are joint in nature. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The concept of the battlefield network brings up many doctrinal issues. 
Current communication systems in DOD's inventory support a hierarchical chain of 
command. A networked battlefield can support a more flattened chain of 
command. Before the network is implemented the doctrinal issues should- be 
studied. For instance, in this thesis a C2 node was placed in the network for 
illustration purposes. The C2 node was used for positive control over target 
selection. The doctrinal issues of how control will be set forth in a battlefield will 
have to be decided upon. Whether positive control or control by negation is used, 
the battlefield network can support either form of control. The battlefield network 
would have impact on the ROE of the future battlefield. Doctrine for the battlefield 
network should be agreed upon by all of the services. The doctrine will help the 
forces making up the network function more efficiently and effectively due to all of 
the service components working on the same level. 
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Security issues were not discussed in detail in this thesis. Security will play 
a big role in the success of the battlefield network. Further study in this area is 
warranted. Some of the issues involved are how to allow allies access to the 
network, the security of the host nation's infrastructure, and how to protect the 
network from enemies' attempts to destroy the network. 
There should be future studies in how DOD can make current tactical data 
networks and datal inks fit into the networked battlefield. The· integration of these 
networks and datalinks are key to full interoperability. If these systems cannot be 
integrated without enormous cost or difficulty then they should be replaced by 
systems that can be easily integrated into the network. 
The program managers for end systems, such as Joint Maritime Command 
Information System (JMCIS), aircraft, tanks and weapons that need external input, 
should ensure that their systems comply with the top four layers of the OSI model. 
This would allow the end systems to easily connect to the network. This should be 
one of the first considerations in any new program and should also be one of the 
first upgrades to current systems in inventory. 
The program manager (PM) for the Defense Information System Network 
(DISN) and other r"!etwork PMs should ensure that their netw~rks comply with IP 
and the bottom two layers of the OSI model. This would also ensure that 
compatibility with end systems exist. The PMs for the tactical datalinks should look 
into the best way of upgrading their links to meet the requirements that were 
suggested in this thesis. 
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The PMs for the radars and other sensors data-gathering end systems 
should make sure that they have LAN, logical, and management capabilities built 
into them so that they can be brought to the field and be connected to the network. 
Their data packaging should meet the requirements that were put forth in this 
thesis. Some of these systems may not be able to be updated without enormous 
cost. If the cost to upgrade these systems is too much for the budgets then 
alternatives to these systems should be looked at for future development. 
Each of the services should look at their service platforms and review the 
input and output of these platforms to see if they are interoperable with other 
services' platforms. An example of interoperability would be that distance 
measuring devices use the same standards. It would be hard to compare data 
from different platforms if their output was different. If there are differences then 
conversion factors would have to be implemented or the adoption of one standard 
would have to occur. 
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